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Employees. A range of theory and some empirical evidence suggest that how a firm manages its employees can affect its financial performance (Delery & Doty, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994 ; Youndt, Snell, Dean, & Lepak, 1996). Indeed, recent work explicitly positions human resources (HR) as an extremely valuable source of competitive advantage for firms (Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994) . Broadly speaking, this advantage is achieved through increased efficiency or differential revenue growth (Becker & Gerhart, 1996) . More specific claims include the potential for HR practices to lower turnover and absenteeism, improve productivity, and increase worker commitment and effort. There is also evidence suggesting that properly designed and integrated HR practices may, in combination, produce positive effects that go beyond what specific individual initiatives could accomplish. Although evidence indicates that there is a universal set of "best" HR practices that can benefit all organizations, some good theoretical reasons (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Youndt et al., 1996) and some empirical evidence also suggest that firm strategy-HR fit is important for enhancing financial performance (Youndt et al., 1996). Natural environment. Several different arguments have been advanced as to why concern for the natural environment could enhance firm financial performance. First, being proactive on environmental issues can lower the costs of complying with present and future environmental regulations (Dechant, Altman, Downing, & Keeney, 1994; Hart, 1995; Shrivastava, 1995) . Second, environmental responsiveness can enhance firm efficiencies and drive down operating costs (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Shrivastava, 1995) . Third, firms can create distinctive, "ecofriendly" products that appeal to customers, thereby creating a competitive advantage for the firms (Shrivastava, 1995) . Fourth, being environmentally proactive not only avoids the costs of 1999 negative reactions on the part of key stakeholders, but can also improve a firm's image and enhance the loyalty of such key stakeholders as customers, employees, and government (Dechant et al., 1994; Hart, 1995; Shrivastava, 1995) .
Diversity. Though the rationales for the positive impact on financial performance of employing a diverse workforce are not highly developed and lack significant empirical testing, many cogent arguments have been advanced. Lack of diversity may cause higher turnover and absenteeism from disgruntled employees (Robinson & Dechant, 1997; Thomas & Ely, 1996) . Diversity may enhance the ability of a firm to attract the best talent from the labor pool, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender (Robinson & Dechant, 1997; Thomas & Ely, 1996) . It has also been argued that employee diversity improves the ability of a firm to relate to a broad customer base and compete more effectively in the highly diverse global marketplace (Robinson & Dechant, 1997 ; Thomas & Ely, 1996) . In short, a diverse workforce may: (1) create cost savings for a firm, (2) enhance its productive capabilities, and (3) expand its markets.
Customers/product safety. A great deal of research has been conducted to assess the effects of firm-customer relationships on financial performance. Most of this research, however, has assessed the impact of irresponsible (and/or illegal) firm activities. Frooman (1997) noted that the evidence from event studies examining market reactions to corporate irresponsibility and illegal behavior is fairly unequivocal: the market value of firms engaged in such activity decreases. Studies investigating reactions to product recalls in particular (e.g., Bromiley & Marcus, 1989; Davidson & Worrell, 1988; Hoffer, Pruitt, & Reilly, 1988 ) have consistently found market reactions to be strongly negative, except for those occurring in the auto industry. These results suggest that investors expect customers to react to recall announcements with actions that directly affect the bottom line, either through lawsuits, decreased patronage, or both. There is reason to expect a positive relationship as well. For example, positive customer perceptions about product quality and safety may lead to increased sales or decreased costs associated with stakeholder relationships (Waddock & Graves, 1997) .
Community. The effects of community relations on financial performance are less clear. Recent work by Altman (1998) and Waddock and Boyle (1995) suggests that companies are reorienting corporate community relations to fit broader strategic plans. Altman conducted interviews with both top managers and community relations officers and found that many executives "believe that community involvement is a business imperative, often creating a competitive advantage" (1998: 222). The supporting research is based on case analyses, however, with broad studies of the financial impact of community involvement limited to examinations of corporate philanthropy (Wood & Jones, 1995). Although work like Gabor's (1991) , detailing Kodak's commitment to revitalizing Rochester as a center for optics manufacture, stresses the strategic importance of community relations to some companies, the generalizability of such findings is debatable. Other researchers have suggested that good community relations can help a firm obtain competitive advantage through tax advantages, a decreased regulatory burden, and improvement in the quality of local labor (Waddock & Graves, 1997) .
The preceding subsections demonstrate that managerial handling of the five stakeholder relationships we have discussed can affect firm financial performance. They also offer a number of extant theoretical reasons as to why one might expect a given management approach to positively or negatively affect firm financial performance. We now turn to defining firm strategy and discussing how it was operationally defined for our study and used in our models.
Strategy
To capture the broad strategic orientation of a firm, we employed Hambrick's (1983) operational definition of the strategy construct. We adopted Hambrick's approach because it was based on a strong and widely accepted theoretical foundation (e.g., Porter, 1980). Hambrick used four strategy measures along which a firm's strategy can be parsimoniously captured. They include cost efficiency, asset parsimony, differentiation, and scale/scope.
Cost efficiency measures assess the degree to which costs per unit of output are low. Asset parsimony highlights the degree to which assets per unit of output are few. Together, these measures capture a firm's cost leadership orientation. Broadly, the cost efficiency measure captures several conditions that have been linked to greater firm productivity (that is, efficiency) and profitability. To the extent that a firm succeeds in driving down costs per unit of output, thereby increasing gross margins, firm profitability should, ceteris paribus, increase (Miller, 1987; Porter, 1980) . Capital intensity, an important measure of asset parsimony, has been shown to be a crucial strategic option (cf. Capon, Farley, & Hoenig, 1990; Gale, 1980) . Also, capital intensity has often been presumed to vary inversely with direct costs (Kotha, Caledries, & Schendel, 1997; Porter, 1980). Moreover, a strong return on assets, not just profits, is the presumed aim of most corporations (Hambrick, 1983 ). The two measures-cost efficiency and asset parsimony-overlap to the extent that depreciation comprises overall costs (Hambrick, 1983) . Further, since the impacts of cost efficiency and asset parsimony may differ across industries, both are necessary to adequately capture a firm's approach to cost reduction activities. Differentiation, as discussed by Hambrick (1983), broadly captures a firm's attempts to differentiate itself from its rivals using a variety of marketing and marketing-related activities. It relates to the degree to which a product and its enhancements are perceived as unique. The key to making this strategy successful is an ability to charge abovemarket prices, which is possible because of the customer's perception that the product is special in some way. This ability to command a premium price could, in turn, lead to greater profitability (Kotha & Vadlamani, 1995; Porter, 1980) . Finally, scale/scope measures the relative size and range of activities of a business within its industry. Differentiation based on scale and scope may involve, for example, competing in a narrow segment that can be based on buyer type, product type, geography, or other factors (Hambrick, 1983; Mintzberg, 1988 ).
When we refer to firm strategy, therefore, we are discussing strategic resource allocation decisions, such as the mix of capital and labor (capital intensity), rather than broader strategy typologies such as those developed by Porter (1980) and Miles and Snow (1978) . With our discussions of the five key stakeholder relationships and of how we conceptualized firm strategy as a foundation, we now describe the two models of stakeholder orientation implicit in the stakeholder theory literature.
STAKEHOLDER ORIENTATION MODELS
The terminology used in Freeman's (1984) work on stakeholder management establishes a useful framework for the examination of the basic empirical models that are implicit in stakeholder theory research. Freeman defined a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives" (1984: 46). Groups typically cited as stakeholders include (but are not limited to) customers, suppliers, employees, local communities, governments, and shareholders. Freeman's definition suggests a two-way relationship between a firm (that is, its management) and its stakeholders. Each element of this relationship represents the foundation for a model of stakeholder management. First, if stakeholders can affect the achievement of a firm's objectives, it follows that the firm's decisions, and hence its performance, may be affected by the activities of its stakeholders. This link suggests the possibility of an instrumental posture toward stakeholders on the part of the firm, with the firm seeking to manage those stakeholders in order to maximize profits (orientation 1). Second, if stakeholders are affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives, it follows that the firm's decisions affect the well-being of its stakeholders, which in turn suggests the possibility of a normative obligation to stakeholders on the firm's part. That is, managers may feel they have a fundamental moral obligation to stakeholders that grounds their managerial approach (orientation 2). For both orientations, we examine firm-stakeholder relationships from a firm-centered perspective.
Strategic Stakeholder Management: An Instrumental Approach
The first element of the firm-stakeholder relationship (how the firm is affected by stakeholder actions) implies that firms have a stake in the behavior of their stakeholders. Further, if prudent management of firms' operating environments, including relationships with their stakeholders, is a part of good management in general, good stakeholder management has clear instrumental value for the firms. The notion that stakeholder management has instrumental value forms the core of Freeman's original argument, as reflected in the following:
We need to worry about enterprise level strategy for the simple fact that corporate survival depends in part on there being some "fit" between the values of the corporation and its managers, the expectation of stakeholders in the firm and the societal issues which will determine the ability of the firm to sell its products. In this formulation, stakeholder management is part of a company's strategy but in no way drives that strategy. The firm's relationships with its stakeholders enter into its strategic calculus, and the types of relationships that produce the best prospective outcomes for the firm are pursued. It should be noted that, although Friedman (1970) did not use the term "stakeholder theory," the approach to stakeholder management described in this section is fully compatible with his view that the "social responsibility of business is to increase its profits" (1970: 32).
Implicit in this perspective is the assumption that modes of dealing with stakeholders that prove upon adoption to be unproductive will be discontinued, as will those that involve resources that are no longer needed. For example, a firm might adopt total quality management (TQM) as part of its strategy to enhance product sales. Presumably, the firm would attempt to significantly improve its relationships with both workers and suppliers, two key stakeholders, in the process (Adler, 1992 Thus, our first overall proposition states the strategic stakeholder management model: Managers will attend to stakeholders' interests to the extent that those stakeholders can affect firm financial performance.
Two specific hypotheses follow. The first allowed us to test the direct effects model; the second allowed tests of the moderation model:
Hypothesis la. Both strategy variables and stakeholder relationship variables will have direct and separate effects on firm financial performance.
Hypothesis lb. Strategy variables will have a direct effect on firm financial performance, which will be moderated by stakeholder relationship variables.
We now turn to a model derived from perspectives in which, for normative, conceptual, and practical reasons, the strategic management of stakeholder relations is rejected.
Intrinsic Stakeholder Commitment: A Normative Approach
According to the second broad perspective, the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model, managerial relationships with stakeholders are based on normative, moral commitments rather than on a desire to use those stakeholders solely to maximize profits. In short, a firm establishes certain fundamental moral principles that guide how it does business-particularly with respect to how it treats stakeholders-and uses those principles to drive decision making.
This model can be generated from two distinct, albeit related, sources within the business ethics literature. One genesis of this normative model is the fact that firm decisions affect stakeholder outcomes. Ethics, generally speaking, deals with obli- The second genesis of a normative stakeholder orientation based on moral principles is the argument that making a strategic commitment to morality is not only conceptually flawed but is also ineffective. First, strategically applying ethical principles-that is, acting according to moral principles only when doing so is to your advantage-is, by definition, not following ethical principles at all. In addition, Quinn and Jones (1995) argued that if the purpose of acting ethically is to acquire a good reputation that, in turn, will provide a firm with economic benefits, why not pursue the good reputation directly without the intellectual excursion into moral philosophy? In some cases, of course, the behavior called for will coincide with that dictated by ethics, but in others it may not. What difference does ethics make if one can act instrumentally without reference to ethics?
From a practical perspective, Jones (1995) argued that the instrumental benefits of stakeholder management paradoxically result only from a genuine commitment to ethical principles. He argued that firms that create and sustain stakeholder relationships based on mutual trust and cooperation will have a competitive advantage over those that do not (cf. Barney & Hansen, 1994) . If a firm's commitment to trust and cooperation is strategic rather than intrinsic, it will be difficult for the firm to maintain the sincere manner and reputation (Frank, 1988) Hypothesis 2. Managerial commitment to stakeholder interests will drive strategic decision making, which in turn will affect firm financial performance.
In other words, strategy variables will mediate the association between stakeholder relationship variables and firm financial performance.
In this exploratory research, the link between these two theoretical models and the corresponding mathematical models discussed below can be described as follows: We have reasons to believe that the way in which a firm handles the various aspects of stakeholder relationships described in the beginning of this article-its treatment of employees, the natural environment, diversity, customer/product issues, and community relationswill affect its financial performance. We also have two theoretical formulations of stakeholder orientation derived from the stakeholder literature, strategic stakeholder management and intrinsic stakeholder commitment, that describe how firms might handle these relationships and the subsequent effects on financial performance. Our approach was to empirically investigate which of these two models best fitted the data. If one of the two descriptions of the model in which key stakeholder variables are seen by firms as instrumental to their primary goals was found to be statistically significant, empirical support would be lent to the strategic stakeholder management model. If the model in which stakeholder interests are seen as prior to other strategic concerns was found to be statistically significant, empirical support would go to the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model.
METHODS

Sample and Data
Our initial sample was the top 100 firms on the 1996 Fortune 500 list. We chose these companies because they cover a broad range of industrial activity and account for a significant portion of the U.S. economic output. Data for these firms were collected for the years 1991 through 1996, the years for which the data on socially responsive actions are available in the KLD database.
As some firms were acquired during the period considered or were not publicly traded for the whole time period, we found complete data on 81 out of the 100 firms. These 81 firms constituted our final longitudinal data set. We collected six years of data for each firm, for a total sample size of 486. In the KLD database, firm actions toward each of the five stakeholder groups are measured on five-point Likert-type scales; -2 suggests negative actions toward that stakeholder group, and +2 suggests positive actions undertaken by the firm toward the group.1 Analysts at Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, and Company establish these ratings by using both primary and secondary data on approximately 650 firms operating in the United States. KLD is the investment advisor for the Domini Social Equity Fund, a mutual fund investing in the firms in the Domini Social Index. The KLD database includes all firms in the Standard & Poor's 500 as well as 150 additional firms in the Domini Social Index. To determine areas of strength and concern for each company in the database, KLD relies on public records of notable socially responsible activities (such as sponsoring local educational initiatives or recycling programs) and signs of disregard for particular stakeholders (such as violations of environmental regulations or payment of civil damages for product safety). The KLD ratings are also heavily influenced by qualitative data, such as evaluations of corporate advertising and charitable giving programs. Additionally, since the primary mission of the Domini Social Equity Fund is to provide financial returns to investors by taking equity positions in socially responsible firms, analysts from KLD frequently visit corporate sites to directly observe and appraise the actions of particular firms.
Independent variables: Strategy. To isolate the impact of firms' strategic decision making on performance, we used Hambrick's (1983) measurement of the strategy construct (see Appendix B). As noted earlier, we adopted Hambrick's approach because it parsimoniously captures the classification 1 Other measures collected by KLD, such as the existence of firm operations in South Africa and the sales generated through military contracts, were not included in this study for two reasons. First, these measures were not available for the entire time period under consideration. Second, the literature has yet to provide strong theoretical arguments for including some of these measures (that is, military contracts) as part of the large set of items that measure a firm's stakeholder responsiveness.
dimensions (cost leadership and differentiation) put forward by Porter (1980).
For a firm's cost leadership position, we used measures of cost efficiency and asset parsimony (Hambrick, 1983). The cost efficiency measure was the ratio of the cost of goods sold to total sales; thus, a smaller value indicates better firm operating efficiency. Therefore, we would expect a negative relationship between cost efficiency and ROA. We measured asset parsimony using capital intensity and capital expenditure variables (Gale, 1980; Kotha & Nair, 1995; MacMillan, Hambrick, & Day, 1982). The capital intensity variable was total firm assets for a given year divided by the number of employees for that year. The capital expenditures variable was the net capital expenditures made by a firm in a given year divided by its sales for that year. The capital intensity variable was divided by 100, and the capital expenditures variable was multiplied by 100, so that the means of these variables were roughly similar.
The differentiation measure was the ratio of general, selling, and administrative expenses to total sales. This measure, selling intensity, captures a firm's willingness to spend on marketing-and selling-related activities in an effort to differentiate itself from its rivals.
Control variables. When performance is the dependent variable of concern, the operating environment plays a significant role ( To analyze the data, we used a pooled time series model. In such models, error terms may be correlated over time (autocorrelation) and over cross-sectional units (heteroskedasticity). Under conditions of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators of the regression coefficients are unbiased and consistent. Clearly, these are desirable properties. The problem with respect to the use of OLS rests with the estimated variances of the regression coefficients. The principal objective is to find consistent estimates of the variancecovariance matrix. Kmenta (1986: 618-622) showed that such consistent estimates can be found by subjecting the original data set to a double transformation.
We implemented Kmenta's double transformation approach for correcting heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems using the time series cross section (TSCS) procedure in LIMDEP (Greene, 1992) , in which the coefficient vector is assumed to be constant over time for all firms and "groupwise" heteroskedasticity, cross-group correlation, and within-group autocorrelation are controlled for (Kmenta, 1986) .
We tested the validity of the two stakeholder orientation models presented in the preceding theory section by using the KLD stakeholder relationship and strategy variables, after controlling for the operating environment. In this examination, a fundamental theoretical question arose: Should we expect stakeholder relationships to affect the firm strategy variables defined here? We believed they would, because our measurement of firm strategy captured the generic strategic resource allocation decisions made by firms as they attempt to successfully compete in their marketplaces (Hambrick, 1983; Porter, 1980) . The strategy variables used in this study-cost efficiency, capital intensity, cost expenditures, and selling intensity-have been shown to have consistent impacts on firm financial performance in prior studies (Capon et al., 1990) . The first three variables capture a firm's fundamental cost posture, and the fourth variable, selling intensity, captures the firm's (marketing) differentiation posture vis-a-vis its competitors.
Earlier, we noted that Freeman (1984) made a persuasive case that systematic managerial attention to stakeholder interests is critical to financial success. But translating systematic managerial attention into action involves making the necessary changes in the strategic resource allocation decisions of a firm. In other words, these actions should manifest themselves in the variables that we used to measure a firm's strategic resource allocations. For example, being proactive on environmental issues can lower the costs of complying with present and future environmental regulations (Dechant et al., 1994; Hart, 1995) . Also, environmental responsiveness can enhance firm efficiencies and drive down operating costs (Shrivastava, 1995) . In sum, such actions improve the firm's overall cost posture.
The opportunity for dramatic improvement in operating costs comes only with new buildings and facilities. Such improvement may also require redesigning production systems to reduce environmental impacts by such means as cleaner technologies and more efficient production techniques (Shrivastava, 1995) . Additionally, improvement may require more preventive maintenance, safer working conditions for employees, and enhanced ecological and health conditions in the organization (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1992). In general, such actions tend to increase the cost of operations. Ultimately, however, the overall impact of these actions will be reflected in the realized cost efficiency and asset parsimony (capital intensity and cost expenditures) measures of the firm.
We also noted that firms might create distinctive, ecofriendly products that appeal to customers, thereby creating competitive advantage. Shrivastava (1995) highlighted the concept of design for disassembly as one of the techniques that firms use to realize this objective. Products designed for disassembly have the maximum useful life and are easy to disassemble and recycle. They are ecofriendly in the sense that they maximize the use of material in the form of products and recycled materials. But to benefit from these activities, a firm has to effectively communicate its ecofriendly approach to its relevant customer groups. It can do so through marketing and advertising campaigns that differentiate its approach from its rivals'. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect that these sorts of actions will be reflected in strategic allocation decisions pertaining to marketing and selling costs.
We recognize that the complex relationship between attitudes toward stakeholders and strategic resource allocation decisions is open to other interpretations. By focusing on capital intensity and capital expenditures, a firm may be investing in automation to replace workers, a stance that is not usually associated with a commitment to workers. Similarly, firms may undertake capital expenditures to increase production capacity without any concern about the impact increased production activity has on the natural environment. In each of the cases above, however, the associated rating on the KLD variables would be less favorable. It is the myriad interactions between the strategy and stakeholder relationship variables that make empirical explorations such as the study undertaken here necessary.
The stakeholder orientation models help explain how the interactions between stakeholder relationships and strategy variables occur. We tested for causal relationships in the interactions to see which model best explained the data. We could then make broader claims about the associated managerial decision making. For instance, if the data best fitted the strategic stakeholder management model, then we would infer that it was concern with profits that was dictating how and to what extent managers paid attention to a given stakeholder (for example, the natural environment). If the data fitted the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model, then we had reason to believe that an ongoing moral commitment to a stakeholder or stakeholders drove strategic decision making and the ultimate impact on financial performance.
Analysis
Methodological techniques to test for the mediating and moderating relationships implicit in stakeholder theory are well established. To explore the exact association between resource allocation decisions and stakeholder relationships, however, would require analysis of additional information, such as data on managerial intentions. The current study provides a foundation for inferring such relationships, which could be supplemented by such additional data, should it become available.
To test the three hypotheses, it was necessary to estimate four different regression models. In all cases, we controlled for the operating environment with the measures of munificence, dynamism, and power explained above. Testing Hypothesis la, the direct effects model, was relatively straightforward. All relevant strategy and stakeholder relationship variables were entered into the model simultaneously, as independent variables. The hypothesis would be supported if variables from both groups were significantly related to firm financial performance. Testing Hypothesis lb, the moderation model, was similarly clear. This test required the inclusion of all interactions between the stakeholder relationship and strategy variables in the regression equation. Moderation would be supported if this model represented a statistically significant improvement over the model including only the direct effects.
Hypothesis 2, the mediation model, was tested using a method outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986) and requiring the estimation of at least two regression models, one containing only the stakeholder relationship variables and one including both the stakeholder relationship and strategy variables. If strategy mediated the association between stakeholder relationships and firm financial performance, the significance of the stakeholder relationship variables would be suppressed when strategy variables were included in the regression equation. In other words, perfect mediation would hold if the stakeholder relationship variables had no effect on performance when the mediating variables (in this case, the strategy variables) were included in the equation. If this proved true, then a third model would have to be estimated, with the stakeholder relationship variables regressed on the strategy variables to determine which aspects of firm strategy mediated the association between stakeholder relationships and performance.2 2 To test the significance of each model, we employed likelihood ratio tests. The goodness-of-fit statistic, G2, is -2 times the "log likelihood" function reported for that model. The difference between the G2 values of the nested models is the likelihood ratio test statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as chisquare (X2; Seabright, Levinthal, & Fichman, 1992). In the discussion that follows and in the tables, we report model results in terms of the significance of the chisquare statistic. The significance of individual variables is reported using standard t-statistics. 
RESULTS
Models
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the strategy, stakeholder relationship, performance, and control variables. Examining the variance inflation factors, we found no multicollinearity problems in the data set, as the observed values of these factors never exceeded the critical limit of 10 (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989). Tables 2, 3 , and 4 provide the results of the various regression models. Table 2 reports the models used to test Hypothesis la, which states that stakeholder relationships and strategy each have direct and separate impacts on firm financial performance. Model 1, the restricted model, includes the control and strategy variables. Model 2, the full model, includes the control, stakeholder relationship, and strategy variables. Model 2 does not represent a significant improvement over model 1 (X25 = 3.58, n.s.); however, out of the five stakeholder relationships, two are significant: the employees and the product safety/quality measures. We therefore estimated a third model including only these stakeholder relationship variables. This model, model 3, is a significant improvement over model 1 (X22 -6.54, p < .05). Table 3 presents the regression models necessary to test Hypothesis lb, which states that stakeholder relationships moderate the strategy-performance relationship. Table 3 The regression results presented in Table 4 test Hypothesis 2, which states that firm strategy mediates the relationship between stakeholder relationships and firm financial performance. Model 6 is a restricted model including only the control and stakeholder relationship variables. Strategy variables are included in the full model, model 7. If strategy mediated the stakeholder relationshipperformance link, any statistically significant stakeholder relationship variables in model 6 should no longer be significant in model 7. The results lend little support to the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model since both of the variables significant in model 6 (employees and product safety/quality) are still significant in model 7.
Tests of Hypotheses
Strategic stakeholder management. Hypothesis la states that stakeholder relationships will be positively related to performance, after strategy and operating environment (control) effects are accounted for. Results provided in Table 2 Hypothesis lb states that stakeholder relationships moderate the relationship between strategy and performance. To test the impact of moderation, we introduced interaction terms in model 5 (Table 3) . We found that model 5 is a significant improvement over model 4 and that 9 of 20 interaction terms are significant at p < .10 or above. Specifically, we found that these interactions were significant and related to firm financial performance: employees and efficiency; product safety/quality and capital intensity, selling intensity, and efficiency; diversity and selling intensity, capital expenditures, and efficiency; the natural environment and capital expenditures; and community and capital expenditures. These results confirm our argument that stakeholder relationships moderate the relationship between strategy and firm financial performance.
Intrinsic stakeholder commitment. Based on the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model, Hypothesis 2 states that commitment to multiple stakeholders mediates the relationship between strategy and performance, after the impact of the operating environment is controlled for. An examination of Table 4 yields little support for this hypothesis.
Thus, the results do not support the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model.
Operating environment and strategy variables. It is interesting to note that the cost efficiency variable is negative and strongly related to performance. As noted earlier, the smaller this ratio, the better a firm's operating efficiency; thus, the negative sign is in the expected direction. Additionally, capital intensity is negatively related to performance and is significant. Previous studies have shown that capital intensity is generally negatively related to financial performance.3 Among the variables controlling for the operating environment, munificence is negatively related to performance, and power exhibits a positive relationship, findings that are consistent with prior strategy studies (e.g., Capon et al., 1990) .
In sum, the results suggest that stakeholder rela-3 According to Buzzell and Gale (1987) , a negative relationship emerges because (1) capital intensity leads to aggressive and often destructive competition, (2) heavy capital investment acts as a barrier to exit from unprofitable businesses, (3) management often sets a normal profit-tosales target for businesses exhibiting higher-than-normal investment/sales ratios, and (4) capital-intensive businesses may be less efficient in using fixed or working capital. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to advance theoretical and empirical research in stakeholder theory. We began by (1) highlighting two theoretical approaches to a firm's stakeholder orientation and (2) showing how these two approaches could be empirically tested using longitudinal data available in external databases. Although much has been written on stakeholder theory, no previous research has specified the models implicit in the writings of normative theorists or sought to test the empirical relationships they assume. This research also provides an important advance in the empirical testing of these distinct stakeholder theory models, particularly their instrumental and empirical/descriptive strands.
To measure our constructs of stakeholder relationships, we employed the KLD database, which uses five broad variables to capture a firm's stakeholder posture. We found that only two of these five variables, employees and product safety/quality, directly affected financial performance. These results reinforce the perception of stakeholder theorists that emphasizing how a firm manages its relationships with employees and customers (especially product safety/quality issues) can have a significant impact on financial performance. The results also support previous management research containing arguments for a connection between the treatment of a given stakeholder (such as customers or employees) and firm financial performance (e.g., Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994; Waddock & Graves, 1997). More specifically, these two variables can be a source of differentiation for an individual firm and improve its financial performance.
It is surprising that the other three variablescommunity, diversity, and the natural environment-failed to exhibit statistically significant impacts on firm financial performance. This is particularly true for the measures relating to community relations and diversity. In the theory section, we pointed to prior research (e.g., Robinson & Dechant, 1997; Waddock & Graves, 1997) that suggests these variables should be positively related to an organization's achievement of its financial goals.
It may be that we found no direct effects for community relations and diversity because isolat-1999 ing these variables does not help to differentiate an individual firm. That is, even though these two variables are normatively important, their ability to directly enhance financial performance may be negligible. It is also possible that other contextual factors not examined here, such as the geographic location of a corporation, can determine the importance of these two variables.
A plausible explanation for the lack of significance of the natural environment variable may be that our sample contained firms from many industries. It is likely that environmental regulations do not have a uniform impact across industries and thus are industry-specific. Concern for the natural environment may also vary across industries' cultures. That is, some industries may take environmental actions more seriously than others, regardless of regulatory regime. Such a stance within a particular industry may be obscured by our sample. Therefore, focusing on a broad cross section of industries, as we did in this study, does little to isolate the direct impact of this variable on financial performance.
Finally, as the results of the moderated models discussed below suggest, although these three variables had no direct effect on financial performance, they did in fact moderate the relationship between strategy and performance.
Strategic stakeholder management. We argued that with strategic stakeholder management, firms address stakeholder concerns when they believe doing so will enhance firm financial performance. To isolate the impact of stakeholder relationships on performance, we developed two distinct models-the direct effects model and the moderated model.
The results for the direct effects model show that only two of the five variables tested exhibited strong effects on financial performance. In other words, the findings indicate that managerial attention to two important stakeholder variables, employees and product safety/quality, can help improve firm financial performance. This result suggests that managers may be better off isolating these two stakeholder relationships from other strategy dimensions such as cost efficiency, asset parsimony, and (marketing) differentiation in order to improve performance.
Results from the moderated model indicate that nine interaction effects are significant. Also, all five stakeholder relationship variables moderate the strategy-performance relationship. This suggests that the associations among stakeholder relationships, strategy (that is, resource allocation decisions), and financial performance are more complex than those suggested by the direct effects model. Although the stance a firm takes toward its key stakeholders is important in its own right (as noted in our arguments for the direct effects model), managers should not ignore the interdependence between strategy and stakeholder relationships. For example, although three of five stakeholder variables (diversity, natural environment, and community) exhibited no direct effects, they did moderate the strategy-performance relationship.
Intrinsic stakeholder commitment. We argued that with intrinsic stakeholder commitment, firms address stakeholder concerns because of a moral commitment to stakeholder groups and that this commitment will drive strategic decision making, which in turn impacts firm financial performance. We tested this proposal via a mediated regression model. Our findings indicate no support for the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model; stakeholder relationships did not empirically drive strategy in our sample. It is possible the firms used in the study did not view stakeholder relationships as a normative driver for strategy formulation and implementation.
Alternatively, a more complex model incorporating a range of managerial motivations/values may be required to better capture the intrinsic stakeholder commitment orientation.
Taken together, these results suggest many avenues for future empirical work in stakeholder theory. First, the most obvious extension is that future work could include survey data capturing managerial motivations and intentions pertaining to strategy decisions and stakeholder orientation. Capturing intentions could provide valuable insights both to help categorize the commitment of firms (as supporting either the strategic stakeholder management or the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model) and to compare motives with observed behavior (are firms' acts consistent with their stated intentions?). Second, a related line of research that appears relevant is the role trust plays in stakeholder relations. For example, Barney and Hansen (1994), Hill (1995), Jones (1995) , and Wicks, Berman, and Jones (1999) argued that establishing trusting relationships with key stakeholders can significantly lower costs and, therefore, impact firm performance. Further, Calton and Lad (1995) argued that the approach a firm uses to interact with one stakeholder group (the trust or mistrust that is established) may influence how other stakeholder groups perceive the firm (cf. Jones, 1995) . Empirical explorations of trust and its spillover effects could enhance understanding of firm-stakeholder relations further. Therefore, studies examining the role trust plays in such relationships seem warranted.
Third, although we focused on a rather narrow financial definition of firm performance, researchers examining corporate social performance have argued for expanding the definition of firm performance to include more than financial measures (e.g., Bendheim, Waddock, & Graves, 1998). A more inclusive measure of performance might enhance the validity of the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model. Indeed, if the normative elements of stakeholder theory are to be taken seriously and the intrinsic worth of all stakeholders acknowledged, such a measure of performance seems a necessary step. We recognize that such attempts can greatly complicate what constitutes the dependent or independent variable. Broadening the definition of performance, however, may allow researchers to better understand the important links among stakeholder relationships, strategy, and performance.
There are also implications for research on firm strategy. We relied on Hambrick's (1983) operational definitions of Porter's (1980) generic strategies. Using measures like capital intensity reveals a great deal about the allocation of resources at the corporate level, but Porter's typology was meant to describe business-level strategies. An examination of the links at the level of the strategic business unit would also appear fruitful. Finally, the generalizability of this study is limited, because of the sample employed to uncover the relationships of interest. Future work should attempt to expand the sample to include smaller firms and to better control for specific industry effects.
The inferences for managers seem clear. Relationships with stakeholders have a direct impact on financial performance. Fostering positive connections with key stakeholders can help firm profitability. More importantly, stakeholder relationships and resource allocation decisions are inseparable, because how managers distribute resources inevitably has implications for the strength of stakeholder relationships, and these sets of variables interact to affect firm financial performance. Managers not currently considering the effects of decisions regarding resource allocations vis-a-vis key stakeholders are at a competitive disadvantage to those whose thinking is more holistic.
This study adds value to the existing work in stakeholder theory on a number of fronts. We began by constructing models that make explicit the theory implicit within stakeholder research, thus opening up the possibility of empirically testing the validity of these models. Additionally, we were able to test these models using the KLD database, after including measures of strategy and controlling for operating environment. Examining the relationships among strategic decision making, a firm's stakeholder relationships, and financial performance represents an important link in the process of gaining understanding of firm-stakeholder relations. The current results support the idea that managerial attention to multiple stakeholder interests can affect firm financial performance, providing concrete support for an argument long advanced by stakeholder theorists (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Freeman & Gilbert, 1988 ). This study provides a foundation future empirical researchers can use to further explore the relationships between attention to stakeholders and firm performance, an agenda that has considerable significance for theorists and managers alike.
